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Wayne A. Logan* 
 
From the outset, Herman Gundy’s case was a potentially very important, yet 
rather curious one for the Supreme Court.  Gundy, convicted of providing cocaine 
to a young girl and raping her, argued that Congress violated the nondelegation 
doctrine when it ceded authority to the U.S. Attorney General to specify the 
applicability of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA) to individuals convicted before its 2006 enactment.  Gundy challenged 
SORNA because the Attorney General decided to make SORNA retroactive, 
resulting in Gundy’s federal felony conviction under SORNA after he travelled 
interstate in 2012 without notifying authorities. 
The Court’s decision to consider the case, numbering among the precious few 
it now hears each term,1 came as a surprise, especially given that the Court had not 
found a delegation violation in over eighty years2 and all  federal circuit courts 
addressing the issue had rejected SORNA nondelegation challenges.3  The fact that 
at least four Justices voted to hear the case strongly suggested that the question 
warranted reconsideration, raising the possibility that the Court would resuscitate 
the nondelegation doctrine, and call into question myriad congressional delegations 
of authority to agencies. 
That a convicted sex offender such as Herman Gundy, usually touted by 
conservatives as a poster boy for tough-on-crime-policies like SORNA, should be 
the person to revive the nondelegation doctrine, a cause long championed by 
conservatives,4 was ironic.  The case, moreover, was not without complication for 
liberal Justices, who are typically fans of the administrative state in areas such as 
workplace safety and environmental protection, but are often troubled by harsh 
criminal justice policies like SORNA. 
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1   See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on 
Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2014). 
2   See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Pan. Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430–33 (1935).  
3   See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (2019). 
4   See, e.g., PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); DAVID S. 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION (1993); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002). 
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When Gundy was argued the first week of the Court’s October Term, only eight 
Justices were on the bench (Justice Kavanaugh was nominated but not yet 
confirmed).  As the months passed, yet no decision came, it became apparent that 
Gundy’s claim was not a slam-dunk.  Not until June 20, at the very end of the 2018 
Term, did the Court resolve the suspense, with five Justices voting to uphold the 
SORNA delegation.  
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, staved off 
the challenge in a plurality opinion, with Justice Alito concurring in the judgment.  
In doing so, however, Justice Alito made clear his reluctance to side with his four 
colleagues, and his disdain for the nondelegation doctrine more generally, writing 
that 
 
[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach [to 
nondelegation] we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that 
effort.  But because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish 
to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment. 
Because I cannot say that the statute lacks a discernible standard that 
is adequate under the approach this Court has taken for many years, I vote 
to affirm.5 
 
Of course, we cannot say for sure why Justice Alito sided with Justice Kagan 
and the three others.  If he had cast his lot with his three dissenting colleagues, the 
vote would have been a 4-4 per curiam decision, meaning that the Second Circuit’s 
decision upholding SORNA would remain intact.  Perhaps he could not stomach the 
idea of a convicted sex offender, and many thousands of others like him, would get 
the benefit of his vote (even if it meant that the outcome would stay the same).  
Alternatively, the Court could have bound the matter over to its next term, when 
presumably all nine Justices would be in place, but this obviously was not the 
Justices’ preference either. 
In the end, Gundy did not live up to its fanfare, and Justice Kagan’s opinion for 
the plurality, as discussed later, was unconvincing.  A case with all the ingredients 
to be a blockbuster in the end turned out to be decidedly non-precedential. 
Justice Gorsuch’s lengthy dissent (seventeen pages, compared to Justice 
Kagan’s nine), on the other hand, is worthy of note.  The Gorsuch dissent, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, could well have long-term consequences 
because in it Justice Gorsuch provides what might be the blueprint for the next 
nondelegation challenge, which, with the ascendance of Justice Kavanaugh (a critic 
of delegation)6 could soon become the law of the land.  Presumably, Justice Alito, 
finding the next challenge something other than “freakish,” will side with his four 
                                                                                                                                                   
5   Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
6   John Yoo & James C. Phillips, With Kavanaugh, the Court Should Tame the Administrative 
State, NAT. REV. (Oct. 25, 2018, 6:30AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/supreme-court-
brett-kavanaugh-administrative-state/.  
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conservative colleagues, and five Justices will decide the contours (and maybe the 
existence) of the federal administrative state.7  
In the final analysis, Gundy not only was a disappointment, it was a lost 
opportunity for the Court to provide a more robust nondelegation doctrine, one likely 
having appeal across the Court’s political spectrum.  In particular, the Court could 
have enunciated a new, more demanding standard applicable only to congressional 
delegations of criminal justice authority like SORNA.  Such an approach, which 
would require more guidance from Congress regarding delegated decisions and thus 
constrain delegation, would be justified given the recognized distinctiveness of 
criminal sanctions.  Although adopting the alternative would have its analytic 
challenges, it would have ancillary benefits, including long-needed clarification of 
criteria used to distinguish civil and criminal sanctions.  
 
I. GUNDY FACTS AND THE PLURALITY OPINION 
 
In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Child Safety Act of 
2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA).8 SORNA, the most recent of federal laws dating back to 1994 pressuring 
states to enact stricter sex offender registration and notification laws,9 is a complex 
law with many provisions.10  Among them is one making it a federal felony for 
individuals subject to registration to travel across state lines without apprising state 
authorities of their new address, the offense Gundy committed.11 
Of particular importance to Gundy’s case, however, was the SORNA provision 
concerning which convicted sex offenders were subject to registration coverage.  
The law made clear that individuals at or near their time of sentencing or completing 
a prison term at the time of SORNA’s enactment would be required to register and 
                                                                                                                                                   
7   Outright rejection of delegation, the nuclear option, could well be in the cards given the 
willingness of several Justices, especially in the conservative bloc of the Court, to reject settled 
precedents.  See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019) (dispensing with state-
litigation Takings Clause standing requirement of Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985)); Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 
1980–89 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (providing lengthy critique of stare decisis in constitutional 
cases).  
8   Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). 
9   See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 55–66 (2009).  
10  For detailed discussion of the provisions see Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism 
and National Sex Offender Policy, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 76–84 (2008). 
11  SORNA makes it a crime for a person who is “required to register” under the Act and who 
“travels in interstate or foreign commerce” knowingly to “fai[l] to register or update a registration . . . ” 
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2016). 
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be subject to its provisions.12  Congress did not, however, directly address the many 
thousands of individuals released from prison before SORNA’s enactment date in 
2006. SORNA merely provided that the U.S. Attorney General “shall have the 
authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex 
offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules 
for the registration of any such sex offenders . . . .”13 
Based on the delegated authority, the Attorney General issued an interim rule 
in late February 2007 specifying that the SORNA registration requirement was fully 
retroactive, applying to “sex offenders convicted of the offense for which 
registration is required prior to the enactment of [SORNA].”14  The rule was 
implemented immediately, before providing notice and receiving public comments, 
by invoking a “good cause” exception contained in the Administrative Procedure 
Act.15  The Attorney General thereafter received a large volume of comments, 
including from states strongly objecting to the retroactivity decision.16  In late 
December 2010, the Attorney General issued the final rule, which preserved the 
original stance requiring retroactivity.17 
At the outset of her opinion in Gundy, Justice Kagan stated that the SORNA 
delegation “easily passes constitutional muster.”18  She thereafter laid out the core 
components of the nondelegation doctrine.  Article I of the Constitution, she wrote, 
provides that “‘[a]ll legislative Powers granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States,’”19 adding that the Court long recognized that Congress may not cede 
to another branch of government “‘powers which are strictly and exclusively 
legislative.’”20  The rule against transfer of lawmaking authority, however, is not 
absolute. Rather, Congress can delegate its authority if it “‘lay[s] down by legislative 
                                                                                                                                                   
12  34 U.S.C. § 20913(b) (2017). 
13  34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2017).  
14  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894 (Feb. 
28, 2007); see also 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2011) (specifying that “[t]he requirements of [SORNA] apply to 
all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required 
prior to the enactment of [SORNA]”). 
15  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894, 
8,896 (Feb. 28, 2007) (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d)(3) (2006)).  
16  See Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative 
Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993, 1002 (2010).  
17  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,849, 
81,850 (Dec. 29, 2010). 
18  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).  
19  Id. at 2123 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I). 
20  Id. (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825)).  
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act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the 
delegated authority] is directed to conform.’”21  
The question thus becomes, Justice Kagan wrote, whether the statute(s) 
delegating authority provide “an intelligible principle to guide the delegee’s use of 
discretion.”22 To Justice Kagan, examination of the SORNA statutory “text, 
considered alongside its context, purpose, and history, makes clear that the Attorney 
General’s discretion extends only to considering and addressing feasibility issues.”23 
In support of her view that the feasibility and means of implementation—not 
applicability—of retroactivity was the authority delegated, Justice Kagan invoked 
Reynolds v. United States,24 where the Court held that SORNA's registration 
requirements did not apply to pre-SORNA sex offenders until the U.S. Attorney 
General so specified.25  She pointed to language in Reynolds reasoning that 
delegation was needed because “‘instantaneous registration’ of pre-Act offenders 
‘might not prove feasible,’ or ‘[a]t least Congress might well have so thought.’”26  
Based on Reynolds, Justice Kagan reasoned 
 
the Attorney General's role . . . was important but limited: It was to apply 
SORNA to pre-Act offenders as soon as he thought it feasible to do so.  
That statutory delegation, the Court explained, would “involve[] 
implementation delay.” But no more than that.  Congress had made clear 
in SORNA's text that the new registration requirements would apply to 
pre-Act offenders.  So (the Court continued) “there was no need” for 
Congress to worry about the “unrealistic possibility” that “the Attorney 
General would refuse to apply” those requirements on some excessively 
broad view of his authority [delegated by SORNA].  Reasonably read, 
SORNA enabled the Attorney General only to address (as  appropriate) 
the “practical problems” involving pre-Act offenders before requiring 
them to register.  The delegation was a stopgap, and nothing more.27 
 
To support her view that the need to register pre-Act offenders was “front and 
center in Congress’s thinking,” Justice Kagan cited floor statements by members of 
                                                                                                                                                   
21  Id. (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  
22  Id.  
23  Id. at 2123–24.  
24  Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012).  
25  Id. at 435.  
26  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (emphasis added) (quoting Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 440–41, 443).  
27  Id. at 2125 (citations omitted).  
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Congress expressing concern about sex offenders “‘missing’” from state registries.28  
The SORNA delegation of authority was intended to provide the Attorney General 
 
the time needed (if any) to address the various implementation issues 
involved in getting pre-Act offenders into the registration system.  
“Specify the applicability” [in the SORNA delegation] thus does not mean 
“specify whether to apply SORNA” to pre-Act offenders at all, even 
though everything else in the Act commands their coverage.  The phrase 
instead means “specify how to apply SORNA” to pre-Act offenders if 
transitional difficulties require some delay.  In that way, the [delegating 
SORNA statute and the structure of SORNA] . . . giv[e] the Attorney 
General only time-limited latitude to excuse pre-Act offenders from the 
statute's requirements.  Under the law, he had to order their registration as 
soon as feasible.29 
 
Justice Kagan reasoned that because the congressional delegation was directed 
at practical issues regarding the implementation of retroactivity the “intelligible 
principle” delegation requirement was satisfied.  The authority delegated to the 
Attorney General was “administrative” and concerned “transitional” issues 
consistent with the congressional desire to register pre-Act offenders as “as soon as 
feasible.”30  Indeed, she reasoned the authority delegated was “distinctly small-
bore,” compared to delegations the Court upheld before, and fell “well within 
constitutional bounds.”31 
 
II. PLUMBING THE SORNA HISTORICAL RECORD 
 
Before turning to the Gorsuch dissent, it is important to provide a more accurate 
account of the circumstances leading to SORNA.  As Justice Kagan noted, the law 
in significant part was motivated by concern over registry “loopholes,” seeking, in 
the words of the enabling statute, to establish a “comprehensive national system for 
the registration of sex offenders and offenders against children.”32  Members of 
Congress did very often express concern over “missing” and “lost” sex offenders, 
but Justice Kagan was incorrect in inferring that the public statements demonstrated 
                                                                                                                                                   
28  Id. at 2127–28.  
29  Id. at 2128 (citations omitted). 
30  Id. at 2139.  See also id.  at 2130 (“Among the judgments often left to executive officials are 
ones involving feasibility. . . . In those delegations, Congress gives its delegee the flexibility to deal 
with real-world constraints in carrying out his charge.  So too in SORNA.”). 
31  Id. at 2124. 
32  34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 16901).  
2019] GUNNING FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 191 
that retroactive application of SORNA was “front and center in Congress’s 
thinking.”33 
Closer examination of the statements makes clear that they were instead 
motivated by concerns over what members of Congress saw as weak state 
registration and notification laws (“loopholes,” “deficiencies”) and their lack of 
uniformity (“disparities”).34  As Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a co-sponsor of the 
legislation, explained, SORNA promised creation of “uniform standards for the 
registration of sex offenders,” emphasizing that it was 
 
critical to sew together the patch-work quilt of 50 different State attempts 
to identify and keep track of sex offenders. . . . Laws regarding registration 
for sex offenders have not been consistent from State to State[;] now all 
States will lock arms and present a unified front in the battle to protect 
children.  Web sites that have been weak in the past, due to weak laws and 
haphazard updating and based on inaccurate information, will now be 
accurate, updated and useful for finding sex offenders.35 
 
Multiple other examples support the conclusion that retroactivity was not 
foremost in the mind of Congress.  Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), another co-
sponsor, urged that the AWA was needed to remedy perceived deficiencies in prior 
congressional efforts: “[t]his is about uniting 50 States in common purpose and in 
league with one another to prevent these lowlifes from slipping through the cracks.  
So we recognize that what we have done in the past did not do all we wanted to 
do.”36  State registration and notification laws, according to Senator Arlen Specter 
(R-PA), had “proved to be relatively ineffective, which requires the Federal 
Government to act on the national level.”37  Representative Ginny Brown-Waite (R-
FL), sponsor of the legislation in the House, stated that “Congress has a duty to act 
and to protect our children nationwide, because these predators move from state to 
                                                                                                                                                   
33  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2127. 
34  The Court’s prior decision in Reynolds v. United States, 556 U.S. 432, 442–33 (2012) 
contains a similar misunderstanding of the congressional record.  See id. at 442 (“The Act's history also 
reveals that many of its supporters placed considerable importance upon the registration of pre-Act 
offenders.”). 
35  152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8013 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 
id. (stating that it is “critical to sew together the patch-work quilt of 50 different State attempts to 
identi[f]y and keep track of sex offenders.”). 
36  Id. at S8013 (statement of Sen. Biden).  
37  Id. at S8029 (statement of Sen. Specter). See also, e.g., id. at S8020 (statement of Sen. 
Cantwell) (“Child sex offenders have exploited this stunning lack of uniformity, and the consequences 
have been tragic.  Twenty percent of the Nation's 560,000 sex offenders are ‘lost’ because State 
offender registry programs are not coordinated well enough.”).  
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state.”38  Representative Howard Coble (R-N.C.), Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security considering the bill, stated that  
 
[t]here is a wide disparity in the requirements of each State, and there is 
little to no infrastructure needed to ensure registration when sex offenders 
move from one State to another or when a sex offender enters another State 
to go to work or to enroll in a school.  There’s a strong need for more 
consistency and uniformity among State programs.39 
 
Previously, the Supreme Court itself recognized that Congress sought to 
remedy state deficiencies and disuniformity.  In one of its several earlier cases 
addressing an aspect of SORNA, Nichols v. United States,40 the Court stated that 
“[w]e are mindful that SORNA's purpose was to ‘make more uniform what had 
remained ‘a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems,’ with 
‘loopholes and deficiencies' that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders 
becoming ‘missing’ or ‘lost.’’”41  
The broader legislative history of what became SORNA similarly undermines 
Justice Kagan’s assertion that Congress delegated authority merely on “feasibility” 
and implementation issues, not whether retroactivity itself should be required.  One 
indication lies in the fact that early iterations of the House bill required 
                                                                                                                                                   
38  House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1505, 
H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Brown-Waite).  
39  Id. (statement of Rep. Coble).  Ernie Allen, President and CEO of the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, emphasized what 
he saw as the difficulties created by the lack of “consistency” and “uniformity” in state laws that 
permitted registrants to “forum-shop” among states.  Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual 
Predators and Violent Criminals: What Needs to Be Done?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 19 (2005) (statement of 
Ernie Allen).  “The public,” Allen urged, “has a right to know about all registered sex offenders living 
in our communities.  The amount of protection a child is given shouldn't depend on the state in which 
that child lives.  There is clearly a need for more uniformity among state programs of community 
notification of sex offenders.” A “seamless, coordinated, uniform system that works” was needed and 
states should disclose information on all registrants, not merely those deemed most likely to recidivate.  
Id. 
40  Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016).  
41  Id. at 1119 (quoting United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2505 (2013) (citation 
omitted)).  The number of “lost” or “missing” convicted sex offenders invoked by members of 
Congress varied over time, ranging from 100,000 to 150,000.  Research has shown that the 100,000 
“missing” estimate is “highly inflated.” Jill S. Levenson & Andrew J. Harris, 100,000 Sex Offenders 
Missing . . . or Are They? Deconstruction of an Urban Legend, 23 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 375, 383 
(2012). 
2019] GUNNING FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 193 
retroactivity,42 yet the Senate bill contained discretionary language strikingly similar 
to that ultimately enacted.43  
The contingency of retroactivity is further highlighted in post-SORNA 
enactment pronouncements by the Attorney General.  The Attorney General’s 
interim rule issued in February 2007 acknowledged the uncertainty of retroactivity, 
stating  
 
The current rulemaking serves the . . . immediately necessary 
purpose of foreclosing any dispute as to whether SORNA is applicable 
where the conviction for the predicate sex offense occurred prior to the 
enactment of SORNA.  This issue is of fundamental importance to the 
initial operation of SORNA, and to its practical scope for many years, 
since it determines the applicability of SORNA’s requirements to virtually 
the entire existing sex offender population.44 
 
Even more telling, the rule stated that the “Attorney General exercises his authority 
[under SORNA] . . . to specify this scope of application of SORNA, regardless of 
whether SORNA would apply with such scope absent this rule . . . .”45  Later, the rule 
stated that SORNA should apply immediately because it was “necessary to eliminate 
any uncertainty about the Act’s requirements . . . to sex offenders whose predicate 
convictions predate the enactment of SORNA.”46  
In the wake of the interim rule’s publication in the Federal Register, multiple 
states, organizations, and individuals filed comments objecting to retroactivity, 
expressing concern over its appropriateness in principle and cost.47  The National 
Conference for State Legislatures filed a comment stating its opposition to 
retroactivity “so as to respect state sovereignty over the treatment of sex offenders 
as laid out in each state's respective sex offender registry provisions.”48  A letter 
                                                                                                                                                   
42  See, e.g., H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. § 111(3) (passed by House of Representatives on Mar. 8, 
2006) (defining covered sex offender to include individuals convicted “before or after the enactment” 
of the law); id. § 113(d) (“RETROACTIVE DUTY TO REGISTER.—The Attorney General shall 
prescribe a method for the registration of sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this 
Act . . . ”). 
43  See S. 1086, 109th Cong. § 104(a)(8) (passed by the U.S. Senate on May 4, 2006). 
44  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894, 
8,896 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72) (emphasis added). 
45  Id. (emphasis added) 
46  Id. (emphasis added) 
47  Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative 
Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993, 1002 (2010) (internal citation omitted).  The other most 
common focus of concern and criticism was the SORNA requirement that certain adjudicated juvenile 
offenders be subject to SORNA.  See id. 
48  Id. 
194 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 17:185 
from the chair of Idaho's Criminal Justice Commission condemned the “breadth of 
the duties of the state” resulting from the retroactivity requirement, calling it “an 
onerous and unworkable burden on the state and its limited resources.”49  A letter 
jointly signed by the heads of six New York state agencies urged that jurisdictions 
be afforded discretion on the retroactivity question: 
 
When each state first created its sex offender registry, it made a 
choice about how the registration requirements would be applied to 
previously convicted offenders. 
 
The decision on retroactive applicability raises substantial practical 
and policy concerns that are more appropriately addressed by the 
individual states.  [The guidelines] will greatly expand the pool of 
registerable sex offenders in New York State.  It will also require the State 
to search the prior criminal history of each person entering the criminal 
justice system to determine whether, at any time in the past, he or she was 
convicted of, or adjudicated for, a qualifying sex offense.  This is both 
burdensome and unworkable  because in many cases older records will 
no longer be available, or they will be incomplete or inaccurate.50 
 
The New York letter added that retroactivity expanded the pool of registerable 
offenders, which would “exacerbate the difficulties that states are now facing in 
finding appropriate housing for sex offenders.”51 Other states filed similarly critical 
comments.52  
Further evidence of the contingency of retroactivity is found in the final rule, 
issued in late December, 2010.  In it the Attorney General stated that “Congress at 
the very least placed it within the Attorney General’s discretion to apply SORNA’s 
requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions if he determines (as he 
has) that the public benefits of doing so outweigh any adverse effects.”53  Moreover, 
the Attorney General’s rule-making was legally justified 
 
regardless of whether (i) SORNA’s requirements apply of their own force 
to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions, and the interim rule merely 
confirmed that fact, or (ii) the applicability of SORNA’s requirements to 
                                                                                                                                                   
49  Id. at 1003. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 1004. 
52  See id. at 1004, 1008–09.  
53  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,849, 
81,850 (Dec. 29, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).  
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sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions depends on rulemaking by the 
Attorney General.54  
 
In short, the congressional and rule-making record makes clear that the nature 
and scope of the authority delegated to the Attorney General regarding the 
retroactivity of SORNA was anything but certain.  Furthermore, gauged by the 
comments received by the Attorney General, the decision to apply SORNA 
retroactively was very controversial, engendering very significant push back from 
the states, underscoring that the issue was not, as Justice Kagan put it, a delegated 
“small bore detail.”55 
Finally, Justice Kagan’s invocation of the Court’s prior decision in Reynolds 
was off-base.  In Reynolds, unlike in Gundy, the federal government argued that the 
SORNA delegation afforded the Attorney General discretion to make registration 
retroactive, not simply devise rules about the implementation of retroactivity.56  The 
Reynolds majority (7-2) concluded that the SORNA delegation “could only” mean 
that retroactivity was not the rule until the Attorney General said so.57  Justice Scalia, 
in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, disagreed and wrote that SORNA’s 
requirements “apply of their own force, without action by the Attorney General.”58  
He pointed out that a contrary interpretation would create a nondelegation problem: 
“it is not entirely clear to me that Congress can constitutionally leave it to the 
Attorney General to decide—with no statutory standard whatever governing his 
discretion—whether a criminal statute will or will not apply to certain individuals.”59  
Justice Scalia’s postulated concern regarding nondelegation would assume real form 
a few years later in Gundy.60  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
54  Id. at 81,851 (emphasis added).  
55  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019). 
56  In Reynolds, the federal government in its brief stated that “[r]ead naturally, therefore, the 
first clause of Subsection (d) delegates to the Attorney General the authority to ‘specify’ whether or 
not SORNA’s registration requirements apply to sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s enactment 
or implementation in a particular jurisdiction.” Brief for United States, Reynolds (No. 10-6549), 2011 
WL 2533008, at 21 (emphasis added). 
57  Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 440–41 (2012) (reading SORNA delegation 
provision as “conferring the authority to apply” provisions to pre-Act offenders and that the 
“registration requirements do not apply until the Attorney General so specifies”). 
58  Id. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59  Id.  
60  Justice Ginsburg’s decision to concur with Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion in Gundy would 
thus appear to be at odds with her concurrence with Justice Scalia in Reynolds.  
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III. GORSUCH’S GUNDY DISSENT 
 
Justice Gorsuch began his dissent in dramatic fashion, contending that SORNA 
“endow[ed] the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal 
code affecting the lives of a half million citizens.”61  He then wrote that “[y]es, those 
affected are some of the least popular among us. But if a single executive branch 
official can write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does that 
mean for the next?”62 
Justice Gorsuch thereafter surveyed the reasons supporting the nondelegation 
doctrine and why the SORNA delegation violated it.  He emphasized the structural 
constitutional reason behind separation of powers and the Framers’ belief that “the 
new federal government’s most dangerous power was the power to enact laws 
restricting the people’s liberty.”63  Among the limits would be accountability: “the 
Constitution sought to ensure that the lines of accountability would be clear: The 
sovereign people should know, without ambiguity, whom to hold accountable for 
the laws they would have to follow.”64  Delegation by Congress to the executive 
undercuts this prospect.65  The job therefore fell to the judiciary to police when 
“constitutional lines are crossed”: “The framers knew, too, that the job of keeping 
the legislative power confined to the legislative branch couldn't be trusted to self-
policing by Congress; often enough, legislators will face rational incentives to pass 
problems to the executive branch.”66 
Justice Gorsuch then turned to the question of how delegation is to be assessed, 
inferring three “guiding principles” consistent with the Framers’ intent.  First, after 
making the “policy decisions,” Congress can “authorize another branch to ‘fill up 
the details’”67; second, Congress may make the application of its rule “depend on 
executive fact-finding”68; and third, Congress may “assign the executive and judicial 
branches certain non-legislative responsibilities,” such as when a statute concerns 
                                                                                                                                                   
61  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also id. 
at 2132 (“Congress thus gave the Attorney General free rein to write the rules for virtually the entire 
existing sex offender population in this country—a situation that promised to persist for years or 
decades until pre-Act offenders passed away or fulfilled the terms of their registration obligations and 
post-Act offenders came to predominate.”); id. at 2133 (“These unbounded policy choices have 
profound consequences for the people they affect.”).  
62  Id. at 2131.  
63  Id. at 2134.  
64  Id.  
65  Id. at 2135. 
66  Id.  
67  Id. at 2136 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825)). 
68  Id.  
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foreign affairs (mainly an executive prerogative).69  Thereafter, Gorsuch surveyed 
the many cases since the 1930s that ultimately gave rise to the “intelligible principle” 
standard used in modern times, which he termed “mutated” with “no basis in the 
original meaning of the Constitution, its history, or even the decision from which it 
was plucked.”70  Distilling what he took as the gist of the Court’s analysis in Touby 
v. United States,71 Gorsuch then identified what he saw as a truer enunciation of the 
intelligible principle test, asking:  
 
[1] Does the statute assign to the executive only the responsibility to make 
factual findings?  [2] Does it set forth the facts that the executive must 
consider and the criteria against which to measure them?  And [3] most 
importantly, did Congress, and not the Executive Branch, make the policy 
judgments?  Only then can we fairly say that a statute contains the kind of 
intelligible principle the Constitution demands.72 
 
Justice Gorsuch, however, elected not to apply the foregoing test but rather 
applied what he saw as the Framers’ “guiding principles,” noted at the outset of the 
preceding paragraph.  Applying the first principle, Gorsuch concluded that “[i]t’s 
hard to see how SORNA leaves the Attorney General with only details to fill up.”73 
 
As the government itself admitted in Reynolds, SORNA leaves the 
Attorney General free to impose on 500,000 pre-Act offenders all 
of the statute's requirements, some of them, or none of them.  The 
Attorney General may choose which pre-Act offenders to subject to 
the Act.  And he is free to change his mind at any point or over the 
course of different political administrations.  In the end, there isn't 
a single policy decision concerning pre-Act offenders on which 
Congress even tried to speak, and not a single other case where we 
have upheld executive authority over matters like these on the 
ground they constitute mere “details.”74 
 
Delegating retroactivity, moreover, appeared to be a “deliberate” political decision: 
“Because members of Congress could not reach consensus on the treatment of pre-
Act offenders, it seems this was one of those situations where they found it expedient 
                                                                                                                                                   
69  Id. at 2137.  
70  Id. at 2139. 
71  Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
72  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
73  Id. at 2143.  
74  Id. 
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to hand off the job to the executive and direct there the blame for any later problems 
that might emerge.”75 
Turning to the second principle, Gorsuch reasoned that Congress could have 
conditioned retroactivity on “executive fact-finding,” such as regarding criteria 
about particular offenders posing risk.76  Again, however, SORNA did not do so: 
“Far from deciding the factual predicates to a rule set forth by statute, the Attorney 
General himself acknowledges that the law entitled him to make his own policy 
decisions.”77 
Finally, SORNA did not involve “overlapping authority with the executive,” 
but rather provided the Attorney General authority to “‘prescrib[e] the rules by 
which the duties and rights’ of citizens are determined, a quintessentially legislative 
power.”78  With SORNA, Gorsuch reasoned, Congress enacted a statute with a 
delegation that “sounds all the alarms the founders left for us”: 
 
Because Congress could not achieve the consensus necessary to resolve 
the hard problems associated with SORNA's application to pre-Act 
offenders, it passed the potato to the Attorney General.  And freed from 
the need to assemble a broad supermajority for his views, the Attorney 
General did not hesitate to apply the statute retroactively to a politically 
unpopular minority.79 
 
By delegating, Congress could claim credit for “‘comprehensively’ addressing the 
problem of the entire existing population of sex offenders (who can object to that?), 
while in fact leaving the Attorney General to sort it out.”80  Continuing to train his 
focus on the fact that sex offenders, a despised political sub-population, were 
targeted, Gorsuch wrote: 
 
It would be easy enough to let this case go.  After all, sex offenders 
are one of the most disfavored groups in our society.  But the rule that 
prevents Congress from giving the executive carte blanche to write laws 
for sex offenders is the same rule that protects everyone else.  Nor is it 
hard to imagine how the power at issue in this case—the power of a 
prosecutor to require a group to register with the government on pain of 
weighty criminal penalties—could be abused in other settings.  To allow 
                                                                                                                                                   
75  Id. 
76  Id.  
77  Id.  
78  Id. at 2143–44 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961)).  
79  Id. at 2144. 
80  Id.  
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the nation's chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is 
charged with enforcing—to “‘unit[e]’” the “‘legislative and executive 
powers . . . in the same person’”—would be to mark the end of any 
meaningful enforcement of our separation of powers and invite the tyranny 
of the majority that follows when lawmaking and law enforcement 
responsibilities are united  in the same hands.81 
 
Concluding, Gorsuch wrote: 
 
In a future case with a full panel, I remain hopeful that the Court may yet 
recognize that, while Congress can enlist considerable assistance from the 
executive branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may never hand 
off to the nation's chief prosecutor the power to write his own criminal 
code. That “is delegation running riot.”82 
 
IV. DELEGATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY 
 
Viewed as a whole, the Gorsuch dissent has several notable features.  First, his 
point about governmental accountability is well-taken.  Congress engaged in an 
obvious political dodge when it delegated authority to the Attorney General to make 
SORNA retroactive.  However, for reasons that are unclear, Justice Gorsuch’s 
several eloquent references to the need to protect a despised minority, convicted sex 
offenders, seemed misplaced.  In targeting convicted sex offenders with SORNA, 
Congress was not passing off a hot “potato.” Congress and the states since the early 
1990s repeatedly enacted harsh registration and notification laws targeting convicted 
sex offenders.83  Rather, what Congress sought to avoid was political accountability 
regarding the impact of retroactivity of SORNA on states, a federalism issue, which 
the state blow-back recounted above highlights was quite real.84  
Second, Justice Gorsuch was right in concluding that retroactivity was not a 
“small bore detail,” but rather was a fundamental policy issue to be decided,85 with 
                                                                                                                                                   
81  Id. at 2144–45 (citations omitted). 
82  Id. at 2148 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).  
83  See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 85–108 (2009) (discussing political catalysts behind the harsh state 
and federal registration and notification laws enacted since the early 1990s).  
84  See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.  
85  Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gundy with Justice Kagan’s contrary view is made all the more 
curious in light of his recognition a few years earlier that in SORNA “Congress elected not to decide 
for itself whether [SORNA’s] registration requirements . . . would apply to persons who had been 
convicted of qualifying sex offenses before SORNA took effect.  Instead, Congress delegated to the 
Attorney General the authority to decide that question.” Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 466 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 466 n.6 (“The clear negative implication of that delegation is that, 
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enormous social, fiscal, and political ramifications, which Congress sought to avoid.  
In delegating this unconditional authority, federal lawmakers improperly ceded their 
basic law-making power and the accountability associated with it.  When they did 
so, moreover, they failed to provide the necessary “intelligible principle” to guide 
the discretion they delegated, directing only that “[t]he Attorney General shall have 
the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to 
sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter . . . .”86  Indeed, the un-
intelligibility of the delegation is evidenced in varied positions and statements 
contained in the several guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General, noted 
above.87  Even if Congress itself thought it was clear in its delegation, the fact that 
the Attorney General voiced uncertainty about what it was empowered to do should 
have precluded Gundy from being the “easy” case Justice Kagan proclaimed it to be. 
If anything, the uncertainty should have made the outcome an easy one in Gundy’s 
favor. 
                                                                                                                                                   
without such a determination by the Attorney General, the Act would not apply to those with pre-
SORNA sex-offense convictions.”). 
This was also the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion concluding that a 
federal district court lacked authority to make SORNA retroactive because Congress vested the 
discretionary authority in the Attorney General.  See United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 857–59 
(11th Cir. 2008): 
Congress expressly reserved the retroactivity determination to be made by the 
Attorney General . . . . The plain language of the statute makes clear that Congress gave 
only the Attorney General the authority to determine SORNA's 
retroactivity. . . . Congress's use of the word “shall” indicates that Congress was issuing a 
directive to the Attorney General specifically to make the determination. . . . The district 
court clearly erred by usurping the role of the Attorney General in preemptively 
determining SORNA's retroactive application. 
In so finding, we reject the Government's argument that the Attorney General was 
not given full discretion to determine whether SORNA would be retroactively applied to 
sex offenders convicted before its enactment. . . . 
Thus, we find that Congress vested the Attorney General with sole discretion to 
determine SORNA's retroactivity.  Our reading of the statute is supported by the fact that 
the Attorney General in fact exercised his full discretion to determine its retroactivity when 
he issued the interim rule stating, “The requirements of [SORNA] apply to all sex 
offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is 
required prior to the enactment of that Act.” 28 C.F.R § 72.3. It is clear that this 
pronouncement is more than a mere regulation regarding the mechanical aspects of how 
previously convicted sex offenders should initially register under the statute. 
Other courts, in cases also involving SORNA delegation challenges, likewise regarded the delegation 
as concerning whether retroactivity was proper (not simply how it was to be implemented).  See, e.g., 
United States v. Rickett, 535 Fed. Appx. 668, 673 (10th Cir. 2013) (“As written, § 16913(d) gives the 
Attorney General discretion to decide whether and how SORNA should be applied retroactively.”); 
United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 923 (5th Cir. 2011) (“This language is not ambiguous.  
Following the plain meaning rule, this phrase delegates to the Attorney General the decision of whether 
and how the SORNA registration requirements apply to offenders with pre-enactment convictions.”). 
86  34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2017).  
87  See supra notes 44–46 & 53–54 and accompanying text.  
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Gundy, as noted at the outset, was a potential blockbuster decision.  Justice 
Kagan, writing for the plurality, was obviously worried that finding in favor of 
Herman Gundy would be a very significant blow to the administrative state.  Near 
the end of her opinion she acknowledged that “[i]f SORNA’s delegation is 
unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as 
Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its 
programs.”88 
Personally, I share the view that delegation in the modern era is necessary and 
can be beneficial.89  However, Congress simply went too far with SORNA.  It not 
only impermissibly delegated a basic policy decision to the executive branch,90 it 
failed to provide any guidance on how the decision was to be made.91  Although the 
intelligible principle rubric is imperfect, it provides a basis for calibrating and 
limiting when and how Congress can cede to another branch some of its Article I 
law-making power.92  That is, if it is applied, which it was not in Gundy.  In SORNA, 
                                                                                                                                                   
88  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019). 
89  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (stating that separation of powers 
does “not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches,” a recognition 
“driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate 
power….”). Whether in fact the pre-New Deal era was the halcyon time nondelegation proponents 
assert it to be, it is worth noting, is subject to dispute.  See Keith E. Wittington & Jason Iuliano, The 
Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (2012) (concluding, based on study of 
nondelegation challenges between 1789 and 1940, that courts did not vigorously enforce the doctrine 
and that decisions were based on pragmatic considerations).  But see Joseph Postell & Paul D. Marino, 
Not Dead Yet—Or Never Born? The Reality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONSTIT. STUDIES 41 
(2018) (providing critique of Wittington and Iuliano study and questioning the relatively low success 
rates of nondelegation challenges they found and broader impact of the doctrine).  
90  See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (stating that “[t]he essentials of 
the legislative function are the determination of legislative policy and its . . . promulgation as a defined 
and binding rule of conduct”). 
91  Indicative of the dearth of guidance, the Attorney General over time, and across presidential 
administrations, adopted varied positions on the retroactive scope of SORNA.  In late February 2007, 
the interim rule stated that all pre-SORNA offenders must register.  See Applicability of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894, 8,896 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 
C.F.R. pt. 72).  This position was reflected in proposed guidelines issued in late May 2007.  The 
National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification; Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 30210 (May 
30, 2007).  Later, in early June 2008, the population was truncated: covering only “sex offenders 
convicted prior to the enactment of SORNA or its implementation in the jurisdiction, if they remain in 
the system as prisoners, supervisees, or registrants, or if they reenter the system because of subsequent 
criminal convictions.” The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 38,030, 38,035, 38,046 (July 2, 2008).  The final rule, issued in late December 2010, echoed this 
position.  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
81,849 (Dec. 29, 2010).  In 2011, the scope of retroactivity was again altered, limiting the population 
of criminal justice system reentrants subject to SORNA to only those convicted of a felony (of any 
kind).  Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 1630, 
1639 (Jan. 11, 2011).  
92  See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (stating that when 
Congress delegates authority pursuant to an intelligible principle the delegee does not usurp legislative 
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Congress simply delegated a basic and very important policy question for decision 
to the Attorney General, without any guidance or constraints on how the discretion 
was to be exercised.93  Gundy, like the two other historic instances in which the 
Court found improper delegations, was an instance where Congress “failed to 
articulate any policy or standard” to guide the exercise of executive branch 
discretion.94  Justice Gorsuch, for his part, advanced several “guiding principles” 
encompassing a more demanding nondelegation standard that would, as Justice 
Kagan feared, hamstring and perhaps eventually dismantle much of the 
administrative state. 
A preferable approach comes from, interestingly enough, Justice Gorsuch, 
when he sat on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In United States v. Nichols,95 in 
a dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc of a panel decision rejecting a SORNA 
nondelegation challenge, then-Judge Gorsuch made many of the same arguments 
advanced in Gundy,96 but he sharpened his focus to criminal justice-related 
delegations in particular.  He wrote that  
 
It's easy enough to see why a stricter rule would apply in the criminal 
arena.  The criminal conviction and sentence represent the ultimate 
intrusions on personal liberty and carry with them the stigma of the 
community's collective condemnation—something quite different than 
holding someone liable for a money judgment because he turns out to be 
the lowest cost avoider. . . . Indeed, the law routinely demands clearer 
legislative direction in the criminal context than it does in the civil and it 
would hardly be odd to think it might do the same here. . . . When it comes 
to legislative delegations we've seen, too, that the framers' attention to the 
separation of powers was driven by a particular concern about individual 
liberty and even more especially by a fear of endowing one set of hands 
with the power to create and enforce criminal sanctions.  And might not 
that concern take on special prominence today, in an age when federal law 
contains so many crimes—and so many created by executive regulation—
                                                                                                                                                   
power because such “power has already been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that 
power”). 
93  See United States v. Fuller, 627 F.3d 499, 511 (2d Cir. 2010) (Raggi, J., concurring) (noting 
that she “fail[ed] to see what guidance [SORNA] provide[d] to the Attorney General in exercising 
legislative authority to decide whether or not SORNA’s registration requirements should apply to prior 
offenders at all”).  
94  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (referring to Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935)). 
95  United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2015) (Mem. Op.). Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Nichols, reversing the Tenth Circuit on the narrower statutory ground that 
SORNA did not require a U.S. citizen to update his registry information when he left his home in 
Kansas and moved to the Philippines.  Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1118-19 (2016).  
96  Even before Nichols, Gorsuch had expressed his concern over the SORNA retroactivity 
delegation.  See United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 948 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
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that scholars no longer try to keep count and actually debate their 
number?97 
 
In Nichols, Gorsuch noted that in Touby v. United States98 the Supreme Court 
suggested but did not require that “in the criminal context Congress must provide 
more ‘meaningful[]’ guidance than an ‘intelligible principle.’”99  In Touby, the 
Supreme Court considered whether Congress must provide “more than an 
intelligible principle” when it “authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations 
that contemplate criminal sanctions,” but did not answer the question because it 
found that sufficient guidance was provided.100  The Court added that its “cases are 
not entirely clear as to whether more specific guidance [than that contained in the 
intelligible principle standard] is in fact required.”101 
Gorsuch, interpreting Touby, identified several analytic criteria.  First, 
“Congress must set forth a clear and generally applicable rule”; second, that rule 
must “hinge[] on a factual determination by the Executive”; and third, “the statute 
[must] provide[] criteria the Executive must employ when making its finding.”102 
Gorsuch wrote that “[t]hese three criteria could easily be applied to most any 
delegation challenge in the criminal context and provide the more meaningful 
standard the Court has long sought.”103  The delegation at issue in Nichols (the same 
as Gundy) failed the standard, because Congress simply “pointed to a problem that 
needed fixing and more or less told the Executive to go forth and figure it out.”104  
In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch again invoked Touby, yet drew from it different 
criteria to adjudge whether an intelligible principle was provided, and made no 
mention (as he had in Nichols) of its special applicability to delegations of criminal 
justice authority.  If in fact Justice Gorsuch has relented on his preference for a 
distinct nondelegation standard in criminal cases, it would be unfortunate because 
there is much to commend such an approach.  As I have written elsewhere, with 
criminal justice agency delegations “[n]ot only do the policy matters in question 
have unique normative importance affecting the liberty of individual citizens, but 
                                                                                                                                                   
97  Nichols, 784 F.3d at 672–73 (citations omitted) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc).  
98  Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991).  
99  Nichols, 784 F.3d at 672 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
100 Touby, 500 U.S. at 165–66. Touby involved a challenge to authority delegated to the Attorney 
General to designate material as a controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act, 
and the Court found that Congress had “placed multiple specific restrictions” on the delegation that 
“meaningfully constrain[ed] the Attorney General’s discretion.” Id. at 166. 
101 Id. 
102 Nichols, 784 F.3d at 673 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 674.  
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they also lack the technical complexity that typically justifies delegation based on 
agency expertise.”105  
Such a more demanding approach would not be without precedent.  James 
Madison voiced particular concern about delegations regarding rules allowing for 
criminal penalties, writing that “[d]etails, to a certain degree, are essential to the 
nature and character of a law; and on criminal subjects, it is proper, that details 
should leave as little as possible to the discretion of those who are to apply and to 
execute the law.”106  More recently, Judge Jeffrey Sutton, of the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in a case challenging a policy statement by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development having the effect of criminalizing certain conduct, wrote 
that “the Constitution may well . . . require Congress to state more than an 
‘intelligible principle’ when leaving the definition of crime to the executive.”107  
Florida, interpreting its state constitution, is one state that has imposed greater limits 
on delegations of legislative authority regarding criminal justice matters.108 
Because such an alternate test, whatever its precise form, would only be 
triggered when a delegation concerns a criminal justice policy, it will of necessity 
run up against an age-old judicial difficulty regarding how to distinguish civil from 
criminal sanctions.109  Indeed, Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in the term 
preceding Gundy, in Sessions v. Dimaya,110 which involved a vagueness challenge 
to the definition of “crime of violence” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
manifested his concern over the increasing blur between civil and criminal sanctions, 
which might account for his reluctance in Gundy to explicitly suggest Touby as an 
alternative for criminal law delegations.111  Complicating matters, delineating a 
matter as civil or criminal will not be aided by the particular agency that has 
delegated the authority, as agencies and entities other than the Attorney General (in 
the Department of Justice) have criminal justice turf, including the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency.  
In the end, applying a version of Touby would prove challenging because it will 
entail two judicial line-drawing challenges: whether the delegated issue is criminal 
                                                                                                                                                   
105 Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 8 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 115 n.367 (2008).  
106 THE VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND ’99 30 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Washington, D.C. Published by the editor 1832). 
107 Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 734 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., 
concurring).  
108 See B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 993 (Fla. 1994) (“The delegation of authority to define a 
crime, for example, is of such a different magnitude from noncriminal cases that more stringent rules 
and greater scrutiny is required.”).  
109 See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of 
Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (1998).  
110 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).  
111 Id. at 1223–34 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Or, perhaps Justice Gorsuch simply could not sell 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, who concurred with his Gundy dissent, on a narrower, 
criminal justice-centric test.  
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in nature and whether the delegation itself was proper.  A positive byproduct, 
however, could be the development of a much-needed, more sensible and coherent 
doctrinal basis to distinguish civil and criminal sanctions.112  Furthermore, a more 
robust, criminal justice-specific nondelegation doctrine would hold promise for a 
doctrinal compromise of sorts, for liberals and conservatives alike.  For liberals, the 
approach would cabin the power to criminalize to some extent, and would preserve 
the status quo regarding the nondelegation doctrine more generally.  For 
conservatives, the approach would rein in delegation in a realm (personal liberty and 
criminal stigmatization) that should resonate.  Finally, a criminal justice-specific 
approach might prove more stable, and more principled in the long term, as it will 
arise in an arena of agency work less susceptible to being politically outcome-
oriented, and contingent upon presidential administration (and the Justices’) policy 




Gundy v. United States turned out to be something of a bust, maintaining—for 
the time being at least—the nondelegation doctrine as it has been known for decades.  
The Court could have applied the prevailing doctrine, found an “intelligible 
principle” lacking, and granted Herman Gundy relief (along with thousands of 
convicted sex offenders like him).  Alternatively, it could have advanced a new 
incarnation of the nondelegation doctrine, a more demanding one limited to criminal 
justice-related delegations.  Doing either might have at least bought some time, and 
headed off the lengthy dissent by Justice Gorsuch, which has not gone unnoticed by 
conservative jurists.113  By maintaining the status quo, however, the Court perhaps 
set the stage for imposition of a much more substantial limit on the delegation 
authority of Congress in a coming term. Time will tell when and if this comes to 
pass. 
                                                                                                                                                   
112 It remains unclear whether the often high-stakes political consequences of nondelegation 
cases will actually result in a superior test.  Because of this practical concern, and perhaps for legitimate 
constitutional reasons, the Court might, consistent with the varied doctrinal demands associated with 
drawing the lines in different contexts (e.g., the Ex Post Facto Clause), devise a test for nondelegation 
cases alone.  
113 See, e.g., Faludi v. U.S. Shale Solutions, L.L.C., 936 F.3d 215, 222 (5th. Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., 
dissenting) (citing the Gorsuch dissent and noting that “four members of the Supreme Court have 
recently expressed interest in breathing life back into the [nondelegation] doctrine.”).  
